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Abstract
The global expansion of armed private contractors has led to a revived interest in researching armed
private contracting firms, especially investigating how their personnel have functioned as an extension of
state foreign policy. However, the literature on the industry contains a confusing diversity of terms when
reviewing such firms, whether private military company, private security company, private military security
company, or even just mercenary. Using the Singer (2010) ‘tip of the spear’ typology, I analyze the
distinctions across armed private contracting firms and discuss the differences between armed private
contractors and conventional militaries, armed private contractors and mercenaries, and highlight the
differences between private military companies and private security companies. I find several substantive
distinctions, including recruitment and retainment, rent-seeking behavior and compliance with
international regulations, and expected threat environment, respectively. Armed private contracting firms
will continue to influence international security dynamics and necessitate further research and attention.
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Strategic Concealment: Locating Armed Private Contractors in State Foreign Policy
Introduction
On September 16, 2007, an armored convoy of armed private contractors working for
Blackwater Worldwide and on contract with the State Department went to investigate an area in
Baghdad, Iraq near the United States (US) embassy where an explosion had occurred earlier in
the day (Whitten, 2012; Weinberger, 2007). During this excursion, Blackwater personnel fired
upon the nearby population in Nisour Square, killing over a dozen Iraqi civilians and wounding
many more (Whitten, 2012). Consequently, the Iraqi government sought to ban Blackwater
Worldwide from operating in the country, with mixed success (Weinberger, 2007). Following
this incident, Blackwater personnel were charged in the US, with two dozen Iraqi witnesses
flown in to testify, although a federal judge later threw out a related case in 2009 (Apuzzo,
2014). In 2014, when the case was revived, four of the personnel associated with the Nisour
Square shooting were found guilty: one of first-degree murder and three others for manslaughter
and weapons charges (Apuzzo, 2014). Later in 2020, President Trump pardoned all four
individuals, and they were released from prison (Safi, 2020). This saga continues to invoke one
of the more explosive legacies of US involvement in Iraq, and yet, the American military was not
even involved. Thus, it is evermore important to understand the role that armed private
contractors can play in state foreign policy, as well as how the intricacies of the armed contractor
industry itself can affect their influence.
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This capstone paper reviews the literature on armed private contractors, then builds upon
Singer’s (2010) ‘tip of the spear’ typology to identify how armed private contractors have and
continue to shape modern security and foreign policy dynamics.
Literature Review
The privatization of violence is not new. However, the prominence that armed private
contractors hold in today’s foreign policy space is increasingly rivaled only by the times before
the creation of the nation-state. The market dynamics surrounding the utilization of armed
private contractors by various actors, particularly sovereign states, has been repeatedly called a
stealth, or camouflaged, industry (Peltier, 2020; Markusen, 2022). Despite this, the body of
research addressing this phenomenon has seemingly ebbed and flowed, with particular interest
afforded to periods from 1998 to 2003 as scholars sought to understand armed contractors’
relation to warfare; 2004 to 2009 following the US employment of contractors to scale during the
Iraq War; and 2010 to 2014 as the research field bloomed and evolved into considering
individual-level interactions (Anders, 2014). The increasing attention given to non-Western
armed private contractors, such as Russia’s Wagner Group, and the global expansion of the
industry suggest the onset of a new wave of research.
The evolution of the armed private contractor industry has occurred over centuries. One
of the earliest recorded examples of private, for-profit warriors can be seen in 2000 BC
Mesopotamia with King Shulgi of Ur’s army (Tsariuk, 2021) Some of the first recorded policy
discussion surrounding the employment of mercenaries came much later from Niccolò
Machiavelli within The Prince, wherein he warns against the utilization of mercenaries for a
variety of reasons, including that personal pecuniary interest are their only motivation to fight
(Pattinson, 2014). However, following the Napoleonic innovation of levée en masse where
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citizens became those recruited to be warriors instead of a third-party entity, the state
increasingly sought a monopoly on the use of force (Tsariuk, 2021). Scholars see this trend as
generally having held since then, with a sustained and durable international distaste for
mercenaries, and with the United Nations (UN) General Assembly releasing over one hundred
resolutions against mercenaries from the late 1960s onward (Percy, 2007). Notably, it is this
brief period of state monopolization of force since the Napoleonic era that is the exception, rather
than the norm, when it comes to war.
Scholars such as Salehyan (2010) explore principal-agent theory in attempting to explain
why states may seek to empower armed groups different from their own military and security
forces while engaging in conflict. Reasons include perceptions of reduced costs in direct
casualties and domestic political capital lost, ambiguity in culpability over violations of
international law and norms, and a smaller potential footprint in comparison to an occupying
force (Salehyan, 2010; Bowen, 2020). Similarly, employing knowledgeable locals can help lead
to successful conflict outcomes (Salehyan, 2010). This functionalist perspective is suitably
complementary to principal-agent theory, emphasizing flexibility and cost-efficiency in utilizing
armed private contractors to augment military capabilities and respond to dynamic threats,
allowing conventional militaries to minimize their standing army costs (Kruck, 2014).
Using armed private contractors as a proxy also can reduce transparency in governments
engaging in violence that might otherwise be accountable to the electorate following the
employment of conventional military personnel (Kruck, 2014). Standard processes of disclosure
of casualties are not frequently as present in private firms as state militaries (Singer, 2007). It
should be especially noted that the prospects of a draft to fill the ranks of a state’s military have
proved highly unpopular, such as in the United States and Great Britain, which have led to

Michaels 4

implications on state foreign policy limiting participation in conflict (Schweller, 1992). Should a
state require additional force capacity and have the resources to hire external actors, it is
therefore incentivized to do so before resorting to something so widespread as a draft, especially
if it can hire experienced soldiers rather than train new ones. Another perspective sees the use of
armed private contractors as simply following free market dynamics, with firms seeking to meet
the needs of clients while seeking optimal profit (Kruck, 2014). This view colors the armed
private contractor industry as providing the commodity of force, for hire.
Contractors and the U.S.
Within the US context, a 1955 Bureau of Budget directive codified a longstanding US
policy of utilizing private enterprise for goods and services across the bureaucracy (Cotton et al.,
2010). This became especially apparent during the Vietnam War, where resources became
stretched in accordance with the war effort, and the US Department of Defense (DOD) began to
employ contractors in a variety of capacities (Cotton et al., 2010). This policy has continued, and
it can now be seen in the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-76, emphasizing
the need for competitively contracted commercial activities for needed services (Peters, 2020).
However, discussion of the intended roles for contractors has certainly become more
complicated. Through a gradual shaping of the definition of ‘inherently governmental functions,’
the US government has outlined functions that must be undertaken by the government because of
their critical relation to the public interest (Luckey et al., 2009). The definition of ‘inherently
governmental functions’ comes from the Circular A-76 alongside the Federal Activities
Inventory Reform (FAIR) Act of 1998 and the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), meaning
both law and policy shape the relationship between contractors and the US government (Luckey
et al., 2009; Clanahan, 2013). An OMB Office of Federal Procurement Policy publication on
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inherently governmental and critical functions in 2011 highlights inherently governmental
functions such as “all combat, security operations in certain situations connected with combat or
potential combat” roles (Government Publishing Office, 2011, p. 56229). Therefore, the
relationship between armed private contractors and actions performing inherently governmental
functions within near-combat scenarios is tenuous.
Kellogg, Brown, and Root (KBR) won the first Logistics Civil Augmentation contract for
the US Department of Defense in 1992, providing dining and laundry facility support (Gambone
& McGarry, 2014). When Operation Iraqi Freedom began in 2003, KBR expanded its role
supporting the US military to further non-combat services from housing to water distribution and
electrical work before later supporting nation-building projects throughout both Iraq and
Afghanistan by 2009, with contracts valued upward of $30 billion (Gambone & McGarry, 2014).
Facing a dangerous operational environment with little support from the local government, KBR,
alongside other contractors performing non-combat roles, developed their own security forces
(Gambone & McGarry, 2014).
US government use of armed private contractors became especially widespread following
the 9/11 attacks and consequent military engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan. At its peak in Q3
FY2012, 28,686 private security contractors were deployed in Afghanistan (Peters, 2021).
Similarly, at its peak in Q3 FY2009, there were 15,279 private security contractors on contract in
Iraq (Peters, 2021). At times, contractors outnumbered US forces in the tens of thousands, such
as in Q1 2013 where 110,404 contractors matched the force of 65,800 US armed forces
personnel in Afghanistan alone (Peters, 2021). In Afghanistan, armed private contractors were
most likely to be local nationals from Afghanistan, whereas in Iraq they were much more likely
to have nationality other than American or Iraqi (Schwartz, 2011). When compared to US
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military personnel in Afghanistan, an armed private contractor was 2.75 more likely to be killed
in action (Schwartz, 2011). If that contractor was providing mobile security services to the DOD,
they were roughly 8 times more likely than uniformed military personnel to be killed (Schwartz,
2011).
Scandals and Controversy
Certainly, the use of private contractors has not been without controversy. An
organization called Civilian Military Assistance was tangibly involved with the Iran-Contra
dealings and maintained tentative connections with the US government in providing arms to the
Nicaraguan Contras in the 1980s, with even murkier instances of participation in the training of
Contras or direct combat against the Sandinista regime (Belew, 2018). Much of the initial
contemporary focus on armed private contractors surrounded three organizations: Executive
Outcomes, Sandline International, and MPRI (Isenberg, 2009), due to several circumstances.
Executive Outcomes intentionally grew their media presence surrounding their operations in
Angola from 1994 to 1997, pushing forward their brand as a successful firm (Pech, 1999).
Sandline International gained significant bad press over its later-dissolved contract with the
government of Papua New Guinea to participate in stabilization operations against a rebel force
following media coverage by an Australian journalist about the possible partnership (Dinnen et
al.; 1997 Francis, 1999). MPRI’s profile grew because of their work through the Democratic
Transition Assistance Program in Croatia, which was thought to have reformed parts of the
Croatian officer corps through training preceding the successful Croatian ‘Operation Storm’ into
the Serbian-held region of Krajina in 1995 (Cilliers & Douglas, 1999). However, there were
countless alleged war crimes, including ethnic cleansing and instances of looting or burning
homes, which brought MPRI as much criticism as it had been hailed for its success in preparing
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the Croatians (Human Rights Watch, 1996). Similarly, MPRI maintained a questionable
relationship with the US government, which had been prohibited from acting in Croatia amidst a
UN embargo on the region, having been potentially used as a deniable intermediary to aid the
Croatians (Cilliers & Douglas, 1999).
Alongside the 2007 Nisour Square incident previously discussed and within the context
of US coalition-held Iraq, it is important to recognize that the Coalition Provisional Authority
Order 17 effectively made US contractors immune under Iraqi Law (Bremer, 2004). The Abu
Ghraib prison outside of Baghdad, Iraq was home to one of the largest scandals the US faced
during the initial stages of the Iraq War (Bina, 2005). The US Army and contractors from CACI
International who provided interrogation and analysis capabilities, as well as translators from
Titan Corporation, were found to be involved in numerous instances of abuse against Iraqi
detainees (Bina, 2005). In Afghanistan, the local armed private contractor industry, primarily
filled through native personnel, led multinational firms to rely on local contractors, who either
bribed the Taliban or appeared to be armed bands without oversight who have, at times, targeted
civilians (Filkins, 2010). A Congressional inquiry into US-contracted armed private contractors
in Afghanistan found that ArmorGroup, which had been contracted for security at the Shindad
airbase, had in fact subcontracted forces from two warlords, referred to by ‘Mr. Pink’ and ‘Mr.
White’ (US Senate Committee on Armed Services, 2010, p. ii). Even though Mr. Pink eventually
killed Mr. White in a mafia-style shooting before developing a clear relationship with Taliban
fighters, personnel working for Mr. Pink continued to serve in security capacities for the US
airbase. (US Senate Committee on Armed Services, 2010).
In 2004, what later became known as the Wonga Coup attempt in Equatorial Guinea
implicated Simon Mann, a British ex-soldier who had been involved with the creation of
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Sandline International and Executive Outcomes, although both organizations do not appear to
have been involved in the failed effort that left Mann in jail (Krahmann, 2005; Hasian, 2011).
Another failed coup attempt in Venezuela in 2020, involved a firm called Silvercorp USA, run
by an ex-Green Beret, and had sought to remove the Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro from
power, but resulted in the imprisonment of several Venezuelan and US nationals that had been
involved in the operation (Dugan, 2020). Therefore, armed private contractors have achieved
limited success in their involvements in actions seeking regime change.
Similarly, the UN Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries acknowledged that it had
received information on the violation of human rights in “Armenia, Azerbaijan, Central African
Republic, Chad, Colombia, Equatorial Guinea, Ghana, Iraq, Mexico, Papua New Guinea, South
Africa, Sudan, and Zimbabwe” by both mercenaries and PMSCs (del Prado, 2008, p. 435).
However, it should be noted that this information is now rather dated, and the line between
mercenaries and PMSCs is not clearly defined within these data. Within the context of the
Libyan civil war, it is surmised that armed private contractors operated on both sides, fighting on
behalf of and against the Gaddafi regime (Makariusová & Ludvík, 2012).
For the US DOD alone, a Government Accountability Office (GAO) report found that the
DOD has been unable to comprehensively analyze its own contracts with armed private
contractors supporting humanitarian and contingency operations (Sherman, 2021). Most
problematically, the three data sources that the DOD uses for reviewing these contracts do not
include complete information about personnel involved or their armed status (Sherman, 2021).
International Law and Attempts at Regulation
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The body of international law concerning the armed private contracting industry deals
primarily with mercenaries, such Article 47 of Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions
from 1977 and the International Convention against the Recruitment, Financing, and Training of
Mercenaries from the UN that came into force in 2001 (Percy, 2007). However, these attempts at
regulating mercenaries are widely seen as being flawed, such as Article 47 requiring all six
subsections defining a mercenary to be cumulatively met to be considered a mercenary by the
law (Percy, 2007). One subsection highlights mercenaries must receive financial compensation
exceeding what a typical soldier fighting for a military might receive, but this is rather
ambiguous (Percy, 2007). Similarly, this definition of mercenary is only considered to be active
within international armed conflicts, meaning that many instances of non-international armed
conflicts are exceptions (Rizzotti, 2019). Another weakness behind these attempts at
international regulation has been international willpower. The predominant force pushing
international anti-mercenary laws are thought to have been African states, who developed the
Organization of African Unity Convention for the Elimination of Mercenaries in Africa which,
despite its limitations in enforcement, signals political intention to combat what these states saw
as an issue (Percy, 2007). Western actors did not immediately match such an attitude, however.
Following the Angolan mercenary trials of 1976 where several foreign nationals from the US and
United Kingdom (UK) were executed for their varying involvement in the Angolan civil war, it
is likely that Western states could have seen new international laws as a potential liability where
the states might be held responsible for the actions of individuals (Percy, 2007).
US Attempts at Regulation
In the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act, the US DOD, Department of State
(DOS), and US Agency for International Development (USAID) established a memorandum of
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understanding that allowed for armed private contractors to be subject to Uniform Code of
Military Justice (UCMJ) or Military Extraterritorial Judicial Act (MEJA) proceedings if referred
by the parent organization (Efflandt, 2014). From this, the Department of Justice would be
notified of a suspected felony, although the efficacy of the following process is unclear (Efflandt,
2014). Moreover, the reliance on a memorandum of understanding excludes contractors
associated with other agencies than the forementioned, removes military oversight and
investigation processes that had previously occurred, and potentially minimized any potential
oversight (Efflandt, 2014). The “patchwork” of laws related to governing contractors in the US,
between UCMJ, MEJA, the PATRIOT Act, and 10 U.S.C. § 802(a)(10) for persons
accompanying an armed force on contingency operations, or in times of declared war, have
created a mix of especially diluted and incoherent avenues of accountability for contractor
wrongdoing (Kemp, 2010, p. 506).
Industry Attempts at Regulation
There has also been an industry-propelled creeping attempt toward regulation (Avant,
2016). From Sandline International claiming to be an ethical company to Blackwater claiming to
work in the interest of the US, efforts have emerged (Avant, 2016). Others have been far more
robust. The Montreux Document was part of this nascent attempt to standardize both
understanding of armed private contractors and establish best practices to legitimize a legal
armed private contracting industry (ICRC, 2008). The International Code of Conduct for Private
Security Service Providers was produced by the International Code of Conduct Association
(ICoCA), an organization including the governments of the Australia, Canada, Norway, Sweden,
Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States alongside 101 private security
organizations as well as a variety of civil society organizations and observing entities (ICoCA,
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n.d.). This effort sought to certify organizations that comply with the code, including
considerations around the Montreux Document, toward raising standards and theoretically
protecting human rights (ICoCA, n.d.). The UN Office on Drugs and Crime also published
suggested guidelines on the use of force by armed private contractors serving in a maritime
security capacity (Drew & McLaughlin, 2020).
However, these efforts are limited in enforcement. As McFate (2019) points out, the
worst penalty that can come from violating International Code of Conduct Association guidelines
by the organization itself is merely a revocation of membership. Notably, DOD relies heavily on
third-party organizations to certify firms before contracting with them. Additionally, firms are
supposed to self-report incidents that occur (Sherman, 2021). The 2015 DOS World Protect
Services contract required that bidding firms comply with PSC 1.52, a certification process
through the American National Standards Institute, a non-profit, and ASIS International, a
related professional organization for security professionals (ASIS International, 2017). This is a
similarly recurring theme for accountability of armed private contractors, where the general
regulation is thought to occur in good faith, either by a certifying industry organization or by the
organization itself.
Attitudes Toward Utilization
Alongside attempts at regulation, there have been differing attitudes toward utilization of
armed private contractors. As previously discussed, the contract between Sandline International
and the government of Julius Chan in Papua New Guinea proved especially unpopular within
Papua New Guinea, and additionally troubling enough to agitate the involvement of outside
actors within the Australian media and potentially intelligence services (Dinnen et al.; 1997
Francis, 1999). What became known as the Sandline Affair led to the eventual removal of Prime
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Minister Julius Chan and a lengthy investigation into the legality of the Sandline contract, which
was later found to be legitimate (Dinnen et al.; 1997 Francis, 1999).
Other suggested uses for armed private contractors have received different reactions.
Actress Mia Farrow recommended Blackwater Worldwide contractors during the conflict in
Darfur to augment the force of African Union forces for peacekeeping purposes in what became
a widely reported non-use of armed private contractors (Isenberg, 2008). Similarly, UN
Secretary-General Kofi Annan announced in 1998 that he had considered the utilization of armed
private contractors in peacekeeping functionalities hired by the UN, although he acknowledged
that the world was not yet ready to privatize peacekeeping (Faite, 2004). It is therefore
unsurprising that the UN has utilized armed private contractors in varying capacities. DynCorp
personnel served as the entirety of the US force of UN Civilian Police through 2004 because of
restrictions on US federal police involvement in international missions (Østensen, 2011). Both
Aegis and Global Risk were contracted to protect UN officials in Iraq, and Defence Systems
Limited provided security personnel for UNICEF in Sudan and Somalia (Østensen, 2011).
‘Tip of the Spear’ Typology
Singer’s ‘tip of the spear’ typology offers one of the most compelling classifications of
the privatized military industry, where the three categories of firm are broken out on a continuum
by their proximity to combat (2010, p. 91). These three categories include military provider
firms, military consultant firms, and military support firms, with each progressively distanced
from direct combat operations (Singer, 2010).
Military provider firms offer services, including foot soldiers or pilots, with Executive
Outcomes, Sandline, SCI, and NFD used as examples (Singer, 2010, p. 93). Military consultant
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firms advise and train, from strategic analysis to providing technical expertise to their contracting
organization, such as Levdan, Vinnell, and MPRI (Singer, 2010, p. 96). Military support firms
provide their clients with intelligence, transportation, and other critical logistical functions that
allow for a force to sustain its operations. For example, Ronco and Special Clearance Services
disable land mines; Strategic Communications Lab deals with psychological operations; and
Business Risk Services, a private intelligence firm (Singer, 2010, p. 98-99). Singer
acknowledges that firms frequently cross between categories or fall somewhere in-between the
thresholds of distinction (Singer, 2010).
Given the highly contentious nature of armed private contractors, alongside a rich history
of both their involvement in conflict and efforts to regulate their usage, there is a plethora of
existing scholarly and practitioner literature. However, in reference to armed private contracting
firms, there is also a confusing variety of terms utilized (see European Asylum Support Office,
2020; European Asylum Support Office, 2021). Three of the predominant labels include private
security companies (PSCs), private military companies (PMCs), and private military and security
companies (PMSCs). This paper expands upon the Singer (2010) typology by focusing on the
frontline involvement of armed private contractors as those within the theorized ‘military
provider’ category.
Methodology
In attempting to ascertain any initial temporal or distributional relationships in the usage
of different terms, I identified a sample of 70 articles that were related to the armed private
contracting industry. I broke these articles down by publishing year and the associated
organizational label of PSC, PMC, PMSC, or noted if more than one of these terms was utilized.
The following figure provides incipient insight into this assortment of works.
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Figure 1. Armed private contractor organizational labels associated with 70 articles from 1999-2022

It is highly likely that this sample is not fully representative in any statistical setting.
However, the reasonably-even divide across PSCs, PMCs, PMSCs, and even a considerable
proportion of articles using more than one of these terms, suggest that there is either some sort of
perceived or actual difference to be made in utilizing these terms. To further parse these
distinctions, I examine the military provider category from the Singer (2010) typology and assess
armed private contractors performing frontline functions. In the next section, I break down the
following analysis into three discreet categories comparing distinctions across pairs: between
armed private contractors and conventional military personnel, armed private contractors and
mercenaries, and lastly private military companies against private security companies. This
thematic analysis leverages both pre-existing literature and distinctions that I have identified
following a review of over 70 articles dealing with armed private contractors, with the intention
of producing some typological characteristics of distinction. I have chosen to exclude
comparison of the private military and security company label (PMSC) because it appears
generally as a hybrid term that encompasses both PSCs and PMCs without making any
additional distinction, likely for convenience of understanding purposes.
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Results, Discussion, and Recommendations
I.

Armed Private Contractors and Conventional Military Personnel
The first set of distinctions fall between armed private contractors and conventional

military personnel. Here I identified three key distinctions: (1) weapons and equipment; (2)
recruitment and retainment; and (3) obligations and objectives.
1) Weapons and Equipment
Whereas the military has ready access to armament, adding the ‘armed’ to armed private
contractors can manifest in different ways. For example, contractors assigned tasks involving the
protection of maritime assets have utilized so-called “floating armories” to circumvent
international challenges in moving arms and ammunition across national boundaries, with the
vessels containing such material alongside other necessities for operations such as food and
medical supplies for contractors to retrieve (Wilpon, 2018, p. 878; UN Office on Drugs and
Crime (UNODC), 2020, p. 6). Floating armories are specifically intended to aid the market of
maritime armed guards, and are therefore frequently located in the Red Sea, Gulf of Oman, and
Indian Ocean (Wilpon, 2018; UNODC, 2020). Nonetheless, their presence alone indicates armed
private contractors actively seek, and encourage a market for, an arms trade that can bypass
national laws and boundaries to conduct their contracts (see Dudley, 2017). Similarly, there have
been safety concerns about the weapons being transferred, the security of such vessels from
piracy considering the sheer quantity of arms contained within, and additional issues regarding
the well-being of the crew (Wilpon, 2018). While these floating armories are untouched by
international law regarding the high seas thus far, there are vast legal considerations surrounding
UN conventions and treaties on the arms trade, transnational organized crime, and maritime
labor that can be invoked in relation to the relatively new phenomenon (UNODC, 2020).
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2) Recruitment and Retainment
The methods for which armed private contractors hire and retain personnel are also
distinct from a conventional military force. Conventional military forces have historically relied
upon processes such as the draft, which has been proven to be unpopular (Schweller, 1992), or
the all-volunteer force in the US where individuals seek employment as professional soldiers
(Cowen & Smith, 2009). Whether using a draft or all-volunteer force, the goal behind
maintaining military capability is to either function as a deterrent against conflict or achieve
objectives during wartime to the benefit of the associated nation. However, armed private
contractors operate under contract with a client, which can manifest as anything from an
individual, business, or state actor (McFate, 2020). These contracting firms recruit employees in
accordance with profitability and unlike state militaries where personnel are theoretically citizens
or eventually going to gain citizenship, employee nationality will vary (McFate, 2020). In large
part, these contracts will affect the strategic operations of firms, hiring more personnel as needed
or shrinking staff alongside the bidding process (Cottier, 2006). Moreover, many prospective
contractors cite the higher wages in comparison with their previous job as a large part of why
they sought employment, whereas conventional military personnel may seek to serve due to a
perceived duty to their country (Pattinson, 2014). A significant majority of armed private
contractors have military or police backgrounds that allow them to display marketable skills for
such contracts (Stanley, 2015; Dudley, 2017). Other scholars focus on the gendered roles
surrounding armed private contractors and their employment (Stachowitsch, 2013).
3) Obligations and Objectives
The third set of distinctions between armed private contractors and conventional military
personnel surround obligations and objectives. In terms of obligations, armed private contractor
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firms are driven by profit incentives (Weiner, 2005; Pattison, 2014; McFate, 2020). Conversely,
national militaries operate, at least in theory, toward the national interest and are not typically
intended as for-profit entities. This creates an immediate contrast in how firms may choose to
become involved in a conflict versus the circumstances under which a state’s military may
become involved. Similarly, there is another distinction between contractors and conventional
military forces in their sensitivity to brand image. Armed contractor logos and brands tend to
obscure or make little reference to combat, but when there is negative attention toward their
organization, there will almost certainly be a shift in image (Cusumano, 2021). One salient
example of this is the changing identity of Blackwater, which transitioned from Blackwater USA
to Blackwater Worldwide before the Nisour square incident in 2007 forced a brand change to Xe,
then Academi, after which Blackwater merged into Constellis Holdings alongside other firms
like Triple Canopy (Cusumano, 2021; Prem, 2018). In contrast, state militaries have been
consistent in their branding, despite any difficulties in recruiting that may have contributed to the
demand for armed private contractors (Cancian, 2019).
Between these two entities, there is also a difference in accountability structures, aside
from potential loss in prestige or international grievances against discreet organizations or
institutions. Armed private contractors are highly unlikely to be subject to the responsibility of a
chain of command (Cameron, 2006). Thus, any semblance of hierarchical accountability
becomes rapidly murky, not just within the firm but also in terms of assessing client
responsibility in relation to any wrongdoing (Rodio, 2021). Similarly, due to the competitive
nature of the industry, it is likely within some contexts that multiple armed private contractors
will be contracted within an area, such as the proliferation of contracts during the Iraq War,
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where this multiplicity of actors further complicated by the fog of war limits the ability to
implement accountability or justice when it comes to wrongdoing.
II.

Armed Private Contractors and Mercenaries
For the second analytical comparison, I distinguish between armed private contractors

and mercenaries, with three more distinctions: (1) rent-seeking behavior, (2) weapons
acquisitions sources, and (3) compliance with international law and norms.
1) Rent-Seeking Behavior
An especially salient distinction between armed contractors and mercenaries can be how
they are compensated for successful contract completion. It may be possible to distinguish
mercenary activity by identifying rent-seeking behavior on the parts of such firms. For example,
Executive Outcomes maintained a tenuous relationship with multiple mining companies, such as
Branch Energy and Branch-Heritage Group. These connections allowed for Executive Outcomes
and its affiliates to realize significant benefits when Executive Outcomes was tasked with
securing oil fields in Angola and diamond mines in both Angola and Sierra Leone during its
contracts (Butler, 2019). These typically informal connections between Executive Outcomes and
extractive resource firms linked this armed private contractor firm with a network of wealthy
financiers (Francis, 1999; Pech, 1999). However, this relationship ended in 1998 when Executive
Outcomes dissolved in 1998 following pressure from South Africa, the US, and the UN (Butler,
2019; Pech, 1999). This relationship is familiar with the current dynamics surrounding Wagner
Group in Syria. Russian companies quietly related to Wagner Group have received lucrative
contracts from the Assad regime in Syria following Wagner operations against Islamic Statecontrolled oil and gas fields, in addition to holding sites in Libya (Mackinnon, 2021).
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2) Weapons Acquisition Sources
Another element can be the source of major weapons platforms acquisitions. While firms
such as Blackwater have used heavier equipment such as helicopters in their operations;
however, typically they have been restricted to logistical and transportation capacities, or lack
mounted weaponry (Mathieu & Dearden, 2006). Two organizations most clearly exceed these
levels of militarization: Executive Outcomes and Wagner Group. Executive Outcomes blazed a
conspicuous trail for itself in fielding its own air force within the Angolan and Sierra Leone
conflicts, fielding Russian military equipment such as the Mi-24 helicopter gunship and a variety
of both transport and combat planes, in addition to other transport helicopters (Pech, 1999;
Fulloon, 2020). Not only did Executive Outcomes maintain this arsenal; they also facilitated the
growth in capacity of the Angolan military, leading to $2 billion worth of upgrades across both
armored ground vehicles and armed aircraft by 1994 (Cleary, 1999). In Libya, Wagner Group
forces are in possession of several Russian military Mig-29 and Su-24 jets, either sourced
through the Libyan regime from Russia or directly from Russia (Cragin & MacKenzie, 2020).
Thus, Wagner is rapidly becoming the contemporary Executive Outcomes. The level of
militarization calls into question the origins of such equipment and underlines a muted linkage
between state interests and the operations of these organizations, particularly with the more
present connections between Wagner Group and Russia.
3) Compliance with International Laws and Norms
The last, likely most fundamental distinction between armed private contractors and
mercenaries considers international law and understandings of what mercenaries are (see Gillard,
2006; Scheimer, 2009). Although I have already briefly discussed the International Code of
Conduct Association, Montreux Document, and the standards created by the American National
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Standards Institute and ASIS International, as well as the international law around the definition
of mercenaries, this is substantively the weakest distinction to be made. Hasian (2011) points out
that African regimes may seek to label armed private contracting firms as mercenaries, alongside
a lasting anticolonial critique and a history of violence from both mercenaries and armed private
contractors. With the Iraq War, nationality could be seen as an indicator of mercenary status,
where persons of US, Iraqi, or coalition nationality could be deemed a legal contractor and others
might not (Elsea et al., 2008). However, definitions like this certainly do fit into the argument of
anticolonial critiques, that Western actors might be given more free range in utilizing armed
private contractors than non-Western actors given pre-existing international power dynamics.
Given the proliferation of armed private contracting firms globally, there may be a better-defined
version of the distinction between contractors and mercenaries should attitudes shift accordingly.
On the other hand, other scholars believe that the mere growth of the industry and accompanying
gradual regulation has served to distinguish enough between contractors and mercenaries (Swed
& Burland, 2020).
III.

Private Security Companies and Private Military Companies
Going further into the distinctions between armed private contractors, I illuminate the

divergence between private security companies (PSCs) and private military companies (PMCs).
Within this discussion, there only appears to be one significant difference and one lesser
difference: (1) the range of weapons and equipment utilized, and more notably; (2) the expected
threat environment.
With the range of weapons and equipment utilized, it is important to consider that the
lowest level of armament for private security firms can be, at minimum, less militarized than
private military firms, per their name. Nonetheless, there is certainly overlap. Private security
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firms in Honduras, for example, frequently field military-grade weaponry, much to the chagrin of
local authorities (Dudley, 2017). Conversely, organizations themselves can maintain both roles.
For example, Blackwater provided security within post-Katrina Louisiana (Wilson, 2005;
Matthys, 2010). However, the firm is far better known for its operations in Iraq (Mathieu &
Dearden, 2006; Singer, 2007; Stanton & Frank, 2020). While firms may operate mine-resistant
ambush-protected vehicles in conflict zones, they are less likely to do so in the contiguous US,
where there is a lower threat of being ambushed. This divergence leads into the more compelling
argument for a distinction between PSCs and PMCs, in terms of threat environment. Roughly
speaking, armed contractors working with PSCs should expect to deal primarily with instances of
criminal violence, such as in providing maritime security against pirates (Drew & McLaughlin,
2020; Marksusen, 2022). On the other hand, PMCs may be more likely to deal with instances of
political violence, whether terror groups in Syria (Mackinnon, 2021) or rebel groups in Colombia
(Mathieu and Dearden, 2006), particularly in situations where there is a weak government
presence (Matthys, 2010). Again, there is significant overlap in how this materializes in the real
world.
For instance, this distinction is constrained due to the propensity of PSCs continuing to
operate in contingency operations, or areas of active combat (Joint Warfighting Center, 2010).
There are lasting consequences against contractors when a state becomes embroiled in fighting
that falls short of a declaration of war, in somewhat of a mismatch of expectations. The
responsibility for this mismatch falls both on the state and contractors, but contractors are more
likely to experience the real effect. In 2004, a Blackwater convoy drove into Fallujah without
any US military support and were ambushed, with four contractors killed in the process (Singer,
2007). The following scene echoed American involvement in Somalia, with their bodies dragged
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through the streets and hung from a bridge before the US military began a massive offensive
against the city (Pleming, 2007). While Blackwater was allegedly repeatedly warned not to drive
into the most dangerous region in the country in unarmored vehicles (Pleming, 2007), both the
training and expectations that these contractors maintained contrasted with American military
forces nearby (Gallaher, 2012). Overall, labeling organizations as PSCs or PMCs may minimize
their perceived exposure in some scenarios while emphasizing their exposure in others, which
can be to the detriment of comprehensive analysis.
Additional Characteristics
Alongside these three overarching categorical breakdowns, there are other notable themes
within the literature. Compared with previous historical instances of the employment of armed
private contractors, there has been a shifting trend to include more non-Western actors. For
example, the Russian Wagner Group has used by the Russian Federation in various conflict
zones, from the Central African Republic and Mali to Syria and Ukraine (Giedraitis, 2020).
Interestingly, it would also appear that the Russian government actively considers the historical
negative experiences of Western armed contractor groups such as Blackwater in how they seek
to employ contractors from the Wagner Group in accordance with achieving foreign policy
objectives (Adomeit, 2020).
Armed private contractor firms originating from the People’s Republic of China have
also been increasingly utilized to protect the assets of Chinese companies in various locations
within Africa, in addition to protecting Chinese embassies and training several African security
forces (Nantulya, 2020). Some attribute a growth in the Chinese armed private contractor sector
to reform instituted in the Chinese military in 2016 which led to a sizable portion of military
personnel moving into the private sector (Kashgarian, 2021). However, some scholars also
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emphasize that Chinese military personnel likely have far less combat experience in contrast
with veterans from other countries (Legarda & Nouwens, 2018). This has led Chinese firms to
outsource their own security personnel from other countries (Weinbaum, 2022), in addition to
retaining the Chinese military itself (Peterson, 2020). Strikingly, Erik Prince, the former force
behind Blackwater, now owns a Hong Kong-based firm called Frontier Services Group that
provides various support to Chinese businesses in Africa and Asia (Fisher et al., 2018).
In other regions of the world, such as Latin America, there are theorized to be over
16,000 armed contracting firms in operation, employing two million people, and where the ratio
of armed private contractors to police can range from upward of 4:1 in Brazil to 7:1 in Honduras
(Cooper, 2018). While these forces may be employed for quasi-legal purposes, others are not.
Malhama Tactical is a self-proclaimed for-profit private military training company that seeks to
train Jihadist fighters (Ardunio & Soliev, 2017). Malhama Tactical has worked with HTS (Office
of Public Affairs, 2020), or Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, previously known as the Nusra front, an
organization with long-running ties to both the Islamic State in Iraq and al Qaeda in Syria
(Soliman 2021). Russian firms are similarly acknowledged to have a frequent relationship with
militias, volunteers, criminal organizations, among other local non-state actor groups when they
are utilized (Bowen, 2020).
Nearly half of the total $14 trillion DOD spending on post-9/11 wars was spent on
defense contractors, from weapons suppliers to armed private contractors (Knickmeyer, 2021). In
fact, the DOD is the armed private contractor’s largest customer (Matthys, 2010). US Joint
Forces Command released a handbook in 2010 detailing the intricacies of operating alongside
armed private security contractors (Joint Warfighting Center, 2010). Such a publication
highlights an acknowledgement of the necessity with which warfighters must consider armed
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private contractors in operational and strategic planning, as part of a larger, long-term trend.
There was also a trade-off established between reductions in US military force structure and the
gradually increasing employment of armed private contractors to perform comparable roles
(Gambone & McGarry, 2014; Van Oeveren, 2016). The instanced utilization of armed private
contractors has proved to be especially popular, with proponents lauding this idea of flexibility
(Baum and McGahan, 2009), however, the lasting implications of both endless contingency
operations and a workforce constituted of contractors have yet to be seen.
If armed private contractors are going to continually be utilized, it is necessary that
international law more clearly define their combatant status (Van Engeland, 2011), whether
acknowledging them as combatants or affording them protections in accordance with their
civilian status. Otherwise, there will continue to be a gaping hole regarding the rules they are
restricted by and how these individuals should be protected in combat situations. The divide
between military and contractor can be especially blurred, considering firms such as MPRI are
purported to have employed more four-star generals than the Pentagon itself at times (Matthys,
2010). The revolving door between public service and private employment is therefore
particularly important in coming to further understand the personnel who make up the armed
private contracting industry and the direction it is headed.
Future Research, Limitations, Conclusions
Some cite the breakdown of the bipolar international political system between the US and
Soviet Union in acknowledging the contemporary growth in the privatization of security
(Mandel, 2001). However, the very degree to which this privatization has occurred can be
alarming (Mandel, 2001). In assessing the future of armed private contractors, one must seek to
understand both the push and pull factors associated with privatizing security and the use of
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force. There is still much research that must occur to holistically understand individual, business,
and state incentives for hiring armed private contractors. Similarly, should there be a continued
need for the privatization of force, greater understanding must be reached in making sure it is
done responsibly and effectively. There are also budding bodies of research that include the
nexus of private contractors and the operation of unmanned aerial systems (Clanahan, 2013),
cyber warfare (McFate, 2020), in addition to surveying public attitudes toward contractors
(Ramirez & Wood, 2019), alongside topics I have already covered. These perspectives will be
valuable to further investigate as the nature of warfare and utilization of armed private
contractors continue to change into the future.
I want to explicitly acknowledge the limitations of this present paper in assessing
distinctions across the armed private contracting industry by utilizing a typology alongside preexisting terms. While I believe the Singer (2010) typology is extremely useful in discerning
between firms with functionalities that span the combat space, this paper only addressed
distinctions between armed private contractors with direct proximity to combat. In covering the
relationship between armed private contractors and conventional military forces, I sought to
delineate the non-state/state actor distinction. In assessing theorized differences between armed
private contractors and mercenaries, I sought to highlight the threshold for legality or perceived
acceptability. Finally, in assessing private security companies and private military companies, I
wanted to dive headfirst into an existing schism that goes either unnoticed or is largely ignored.
It is possible that I have produced distinctions that others may see as limited in value, such as
discerning between mercenaries and armed private contractors (see McFate, 2020). Nonetheless,
it is my hope that some of the included examples can help establish criteria for the acceptable
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behavior of armed private contractors, as well as highlighting some of the distinctions and
extremities of the industry that have occurred thus far.
Additional limitations into the overall research of armed private contractors involve the
sheer opacity of the industry. Armed private contractors are theorized to have initially shifted in
usage from covert operations toward conventional practice during the Vietnam War era
(Thomson, 2018). However, it is wholly unclear to what extent armed private contractors are
employed in covert and clandestine operations in contemporary times. It is therefore
extraordinarily difficult to gain a grasp of the extent to which armed private contractors are
utilized by states through this nexus. Moreover, this is an industry that highly values privacy at
large, from tracking convoy movement to emails (Gambone & McGarry, 2014; McFate, 2019).
Thus, while the prospects of startling insight are low, it is ever more important for further
research to occur, especially closer to the source.
Lastly, I want to conclude on a final observation from the literature, that armed private
contractors are either perpetrators or victims. Many instances of armed private contractor usage
are either sensational or sensationalized. Considering how little the general public knows, or can
know, about the industry, it makes sense why such a perspective has developed. Nonetheless, it
is important to formulate policy around the utilization of armed private contractors that protects
contractors as much as people affected by their operations. Not only should the role of armed
private contractors be considered in assessing state foreign policy, but their growing influence on
the privatization of security and the future of warfare cannot be denied.
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